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THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL LABOR FACTORS ON 
INNOVATION COSTS OF ENTERPRISES  
IN RUSSIAN REGIONS 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of labor loyalty and the labor market situation on 
companies’ costs of innovation in eighty-one Russian regions. First, we determined the mathematical 
model of workforce loyalty and the economic indicators for this model. We believe that workforce 
loyalty can be measured as the ratio of number of unemployed people to the number of available job 
vacancies. If we approach workforce loyalty in such a way, it is important to use the indicators for 
one specific group of workers (with the same qualification) to exclude the effects of structural 
unemployment. Second, we identified the factors shaping the loyalty of the workforce in Russian 
regions and included them in our model to find the relationship between the above-described 
variables and companies’ willingness to invest in research and development. We analyzed the data 
and applied econometric methods to test our hypothesis that investment in innovation and labor 
loyalty are interdependent in Russian regions. Our hypothesis was confirmed as we established that 
a decrease in workers’ loyalty to their employers leads to a rise in the motivation of the latter to 
invest in innovation. 
Keywords: unemployment, research and development, demand for labor, employment protection, innovations, employment 
protection legislation 
Introduction. Literature Review 
Academic literature has already documented the contradictory effects of employment protection 
legislation (EPL). According to one group of studies, EPL has a negative effect on productivity due to inefficient 
worker reallocation. Another group of studies, for example, Pierre and Scarpetta [1], has shown that EPL 
stimulates companies to innovate and train. Acharya et al. [2] use the case of staggered adoption of wrongful 
discharge laws in the U.S. to show that EPL spurs innovation and establishment of new firms. Koeniger [3] 
proves that countries with strict EPL tend to specialize in the improvement of the existing products. 
Theoretically, the positive impact of EPL on training and innovation can be explained by the decreased 
fluctuation of employees [4], [5]; the increased cost of laying oﬀ innovating and thus sometimes 
underperforming employees [2]; and by firms’ motivation to improve the existing products in order to ensure 
their competitiveness [3]. All these explanations are important to understand how EPL influences the 
economy.  
These studies focus on how firms adjust their organization, which means that they are not able to explain 
why the innovation and manufacturing sectors grow [2], [6] at the expense of others [7].  
Researchers in the field of labor economics got interested in issues related to employment protection 
while studying such problems as flexibility and adjustment, duality and segmentation of the labor market, 
the dynamics of unemployment and employment. In our paper, we decided to look into the factors that 
determine the level of employment and unemployment. 
Negative productivity eﬀects from ineﬃcient labor reallocation are discussed in a number of previous 
studies [6], [8], [9], [10], and [11]. Pierre and Scarpetta [1] report that the hard influence of EPL (due to high 
unemployment in the region or country) is particularly detrimental to the growth prospects of medium-sized 
ﬁrms.  
Other authors emphasize the positive aspects of EPL: for instance, Bertola [12] shows that although EPL 
lowers the returns on irreversible investment and thus the speed of capital accumulation, it shifts the income 
distribution towards workers with no capital income. This explains why trade unions often favor stricter EPL. 
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Kessing [13] argues that ﬁrms facing EPL have a stronger average market position as they can credibly commit 
to defending their position against potential competitors, because EPL makes the market exit very costly. 
In this paper, we are trying to expand the model of EPL influence to include the market legislation and 
to look into the notion of labor loyalty and its impact on innovation. We assume that the most significant 
impact of trade unions and employment protection laws is that they reduce workforce loyalty because 
employees start having higher expectations concerning their working conditions, wages and perks. 
We suppose that the degree of the workforce’s loyalty can be measured not only by the strength of the 
employment protection law but also by the de facto data on the employment structure of the population. 
Therefore, if we assume that the qualifications of the unemployed correspond to the qualifications required 
to apply for a vacant workplace, we can make a conclusion that unemployment results from employees’ own 
reluctance to accept the proposed working conditions. This is what we call disloyalty to the employer on the 
regional level. If we look at the ratio of job vacancies to the number of unemployed people in the region, we 
may get a general idea of workers’ propensity to stay loyal to their employers. 
The local firms’ investment in innovation was taken as an indicator characterizing innovative 
development. We understand that the overall development of innovation in the region is not limited to this 
indicator, but we assume that it is this component that will be influenced the most by the situation in the 
labor market. 
The internal costs of research and development are the actual costs of research and development in the 
country expressed in monetary terms. These costs include the cost of research funded from abroad except 
for the payments that were actually made abroad. Their assessment is based on the statistics of 
organizations’ R&D expenditures in the reporting year, regardless of the source of funding. 
 
Methodology and Data 
In our paper we used methods of econometric modeling to describe the data on the regions and to find 
the evidence to support our hypothesis. For better evaluation of the model we used panel data to describe 
the individual effects of observation groups. The panel data includes both cross-sectional data and time-
series data: at each moment of time, there is spatial data corresponding to each economic unit and for each 
object, the corresponding data form one or several time series. 
Due to their special structure, panel data allow us to build more flexible and meaningful models, which, 
unlike the models based on cross-sectional data, allow us to solve a wider range of problems. In particular, 
we can take into account and analyze individual differences between economic units, which is crucial for 
studies based on regional data but cannot be done within the framework of standard regression models.  
We conducted econometric research on the basis of the statistical data for 81 Russian regions over the 
period between 2011 and 20141. Chukotka region, the Jewish Autonomous District, the Crimea and 
Sevastopol were excluded from our study due to the lack of open access to the necessary information. The 
choice of the time period was determined by the availability of the necessary data, which helped to create a 
balanced panel and achieve more accurate estimates. 
As an explicable variable reflecting the degree of regional companies’ interest in innovation, we chose 
the indicator of R&D costs. First of all, these include the development of the technological aspects of fixed 
capital and improvement of production efficiency by updating technology. 
To describe the situation on the labor market, we have chosen two key indicators: 
1) The unemployment rate among the population with higher education; 
2) The demand for qualified personnel with higher education (the number of vacancies). 
These indicators were chosen for the following reasons. First of all, we consider unemployment as a 
factor that can show us the overall situation in the region's economy (it is well known that high 
unemployment causes economic problems). According to the law of supply and demand, a high level of 
unemployment signifies that labor in the region already is or is going to be very cheap. 
As the second regressor, we took the labor demand indicator. It shows the company’s degree of interest 
in qualified employees as well as its willingness to develop its production, extensively or intensively.  In 
                                                          
1 Federal State Statistics Service. Retrieved from: www.gks.ru 
A. N. Kozlovskaya, E. E. Rukhman 
R-Economy Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2017 242 
 
addition, the company’s need for staff indicates that it has financial resources which it is ready to invest in 
new employees, offering them a good salary and training opportunities.  
What is particularly interesting, however, is how these indicators interact with each other within one 
model. Speaking about the delta between the number of unemployed people and vacant jobs, we can explain 
such important indicator as employee loyalty at the regional level. Employees’ loyalty determines the degree 
of their willingness to continue working for their companies and their enthusiasm in searching for another 
job elsewhere. If the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of unemployed people is large (always 
in the same categories of labor), it can signify a low level of employees’ loyalty.  
The direct analysis of the data was carried out in Stata program. We applied descriptive statistics for 
more comprehensive description of the collected data. 
Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D costs 8468.243 30170.96 6.068 298249 
Unemployment 15266.65 19567.16 70 149549 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
55755.56 41411.51 1000 238000 
 
The results of direct regression modelling are as follows:  
Table 2.  
Linear regression 
Variable Coefficient 
Unemployment 1.405*** 
(0.044) 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
-0.117*** 
(0.02) 
Constant -6439.557*** 
(1314) 
 
R-Squared 0.7345 
 
The explanatory power of the model is shown by R-squared, which in our case is equal to 73.5%. This is 
a fairly good level of the model’s explanatory ability provided that only two factors are included in it (R ^ 2 
always increases with the number of regressors). 
Both indicators are significant. Nevertheless, it makes sense to test heteroscedasticity in the model that 
can make estimates shift and create an incorrect impression of their effect on the endogenous variable. 
White's test with the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is demonstrated below: 
 
Fig. 4. White heteroscedasticity test 
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To deal with heteroscedasticity, error correction is necessary.  
Table 3.  
Сorrected error estimates 
Variable Coefficient 
Unemployment 1.405*** 
(0.16) 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
-0.117*** 
(0.033) 
Constant -6439.557*** 
(1396) 
 
R-Squared 0.7345 
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to assess the possibility of multicollinearity between the unemployment 
rate and the demand for qualified personnel, which we did with the help of the VIF-test in Stata program. 
Table 4.  
VIF-test 
Variable VIF 
Unemployment 1.21 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
1.21 
 
We use VIF <4 to eliminate multicollinearity between the indicators. 
Now that we have checked the adequacy of the indicators it is necessary to make sure that the model 
specification is correct. This will help us to understand whether it is worth looking for some other form of 
dependence or the linear model describes the existing dependence. Thus, we need to run the Ramsey Reset 
test.  
 
Fig. 5. Ramsey test 
Probability is lower than the level of significance, which signifies the correct specification of the model.  
Finally, what we need to consider is the kind of individual effects that the data have. In addition to the 
pooled model, we should also build models that take into account the individual effects of observations.  
Between- and within-group regression modelling augments cross-sectional analysis of epidemiological 
data by supporting the unmasking of non-causal associations arising from hidden confounding at different 
levels. The between-group regression is the original model rewritten in terms of the time-averaged values of 
the variables. In this case, the value of R-sq between reflects the quality of the regression fit and is large 
enough (0.7220), that is, the change in time averages for each region has a more significant effect on each 
variable than the time variation of these indicators relative to the average. 
The results of the between-group regression modelling are as follows: 
Table 5.  
Between regression 
Variable Coefficient 
Unemployment 1.48*** 
(0.09) 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
-0.149*** 
(0.044) 
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Constant -5819.788** 
(2735) 
 
R-Squared  
within 0.05 
between 0.77 
overall 0.73 
 
Our regression and indicators are still applicable, which allows us to go on to make models with fixed 
and random effects and choose the best model. 
Table 6.  
Model with fixed effects 
Variable Coefficient 
Unemployment 0,156** 
(0.0789) 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
-0.085*** 
(0.0264) 
Constant 10824*** 
(2275) 
 
R-Squared  
within 0.069 
between 0.2843 
overall 0.2573 
 
 
Table 6.  
Model with random effects 
Variable Coefficient 
Unemployment 0,7245*** 
(0.062) 
Demand for qualified 
personnel 
0.001 
(0.0234) 
Constant -2659*** 
(2476) 
 
R-Squared  
within 0.0387 
between 0.7461 
overall 0.7122 
 
First of all, we need to compare the pooled regression model with the random effects model. 
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Fig. 6. Breusch and Pagan test 
Since the p-level is <0.01, the main hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the model with random effects describes 
our data better than the pooled regression model. After that, we need to compare the fixed effects model 
with the random effects model. 
 
Fig. 7. Hausman test 
Since the p-level is <0.01, the main hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the model with fixed effects is better 
than the model with random effects. 
According to the data for 81 Russian regions for a five-year time interval, we obtained the following 
quantitative dependencies: 
- direct dependence of R&D costs on the number of vacancies for people with higher education; 
- inverse dependence of R&D costs on the number of unemployed people. 
With an increase in the demand for labor in 1 workplace, enterprises are ready to spend 15.96 thousand 
rubles on research instead of trying to attract an employee to this place. However, with an increase in 
unemployment (for example, if we add one more unemployed person), companies’ investments in research 
and development decline by 3.34 thousand rubles. 
 
Results 
The results of our analysis have confirmed our initial hypothesis that the situation in the labor market 
correlates with the readiness of regional companies to invest in innovation. The divergent effects of 
unemployment and the demand for personnel are easily explained. As far as the impact of unemployment is 
concerned, the higher is the unemployment rate, the less regional companies are ready to invest in 
innovation.   
According to the above-mentioned studies, unemployment negatively affects regional economy. It also 
leads to declining subsidies in research and development and, therefore, innovation. This trend is associated 
with the influence of the employment protection law: trade unions are campaigning for less efficient use of 
the labor force, imposing greater involvement of labor capital in production than it is necessary. Despite all 
the claims that the main purpose of businesses is to create jobs, no businessman will want to expand their 
company’s staff without a good reason. Therefore, when unemployment in the region is high, legal 
impediments together with the high labor supply make investing in innovative development less profitable 
for businesses. We should also point out the role of labor supply: when the labor supply is high, the price of 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       26.15
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
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human resources falls, making the costs of attracting labor capital lower than the marginal costs of fixed 
capital and, consequently, R&D costs. 
As for the workforce demand, it has a positive correlation with investments in R&D because it is 
impossible to provide the necessary amount of labor resources for the operation of enterprises, which makes 
it necessary to invest in capital (and increase its efficiency through innovation). This approach has been 
described and tested by a number of reliable studies [1], [3]. Such behavior of companies fits well with the 
hypothesis that the production function in most industries is described by the Cobb-Douglas function.  
Apart from the above-described reasons, there is one more situation to be considered if the two 
conditions are fulfilled simultaneously:  
1) unemployment co-exists with the demand for personnel; 
2) there is little or no structural unemployment (to meet this condition, in our model we use the rate of 
unemployment only for individuals with higher education; the same principle applies to the demand for 
personnel).  
If both of these conditions are met, we can say that employees are disloyal to their enterprises. 
Disloyalty may result from an inadequate wage level, inadequate working conditions or strong protection of 
trade unions. Either way, low employee loyalty makes investment in the workforce less attractive, which 
creates an additional incentive for innovation and development in terms of fixed capital. 
Obviously, when it comes to the impact of the labor market situation on innovation, it is logical to 
assume some endogeneity, especially if we accept the hypothesis of technological unemployment generated 
by technological changes and leading to unemployment. 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis was repeatedly discussed by the leading economists as early as in the 
1930s (for example, by John Maynard Keynes). Among other things, such option as reducing the workforce 
in order to increase investment opportunities was not considered because it would result in protests on 
behalf of trade unions. 
In order to make sure that there was no endogeneity, we ran the reverse regression, which turned out 
to be insignificant as well as the coefficient of the cost of investment in R&D. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis has proven the initial hypothesis about the interdependence between investment in 
innovation and labor loyalty in Russian regions, which means that a decrease in workers’ loyalty increases 
the employers’ motivation to invest in innovation.  
It should be noted that the chosen indicator is by no means the only one that affects innovation, even if 
we focus only on the labor market. For instance, the number of trade unions in the region is another indicator 
of workers’ loyalty and describes the degree of their protection. Moreover, it is possible to adjust the level 
of structural unemployment in order to dispel any doubts concerning the discrepancy between the 
qualifications of unemployed people and the qualifications required by companies.  
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